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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sydney Lorelei Neal appeals from the judgment entered upon her
conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance. Neal
contends the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Neal with felony possession of a controlled substance
- methadone.

(R., pp.25-26.)

Neal filed a motion to dismiss claiming "the

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing ... failed to establish that there
was reasonable or probable cause to believe that [she] committed the crime for
which she was held to answer."

(R., pp.38-39.)

Neal also filed a supporting

memorandum specifically raising two issues:
A)

Does the presence of a controlled substance in a newborn
child's blood present sufficient evidence to support a charge
of Possession of a Controlled Substance against the
mother?

B)

Did the state fail to provide adequate, competent evidence
to establish probable cause on all the elements of the crime
of Possession of a Controlled Substance at the preliminary
hearing?

(R., p.41.)

The court denied Neal's motion. (R., pp.62-69.) Neal thereafter entered a
conditional guilty plea to the felony possession charge, reserving her right to
challenge the court's denial of her motion to dismiss.

(R., p.72.)

The court

entered a withheld judgment and placed Neal on probation for five years. (R.,
pp.75-80.) Neal filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.84-86.)

1

ISSUE
Neal states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss?

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Because the state presented sufficient evidence to find probable cause to
bind Neal over on the charge of felony possession of a controlled substance, has
Neal failed to establish error in the denial of her motion to dismiss?

2

ARGUMENT
Neal Has Failed To Establish She Was Entitled To Dismissal Of The Felony
Possession Of A Controlled Substance Charge Based On A Lack Of Probable
Cause At The Preliminary Hearing
A.

Introduction
Neal contends the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss,

arguing she was entitled to dismissal of "the State's information based upon the
failure of the State to establish probable cause for every element of the charged
offense." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) More specifically, Neal asserts the state failed
to establish she "had both knowledge of the methadone and exercised dominion
and control over the methadone found in her newborn's umbilical cord."
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

Neal's claim fails.

The state presented substantial

evidence at the preliminary hearing from which the magistrate could find
probable cause to bind Neal over for felony possession of a controlled
substance.

As such, Neal has failed to establish error in. the district court's

denial of her motion to dismiss.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A magistrate's finding of probable cause to believe that a defendant has

committed an offense should be overturned only upon a showing that the
magistrate abused its discretion." State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 504, 80 P.3d
1103, 1105 (Ct. App. 2003). When the appellate court reviews a discretionary
decision it considers whether the district court (1) perceived the issue as one of
discretion, (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with
applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
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kl

(citation omitted). "The decision of a magistrate that there exists probable

cause to hold a defendant to answer before the district court should be
overturned only on a clear showing that the committing magistrate abused its
discretion." State v. Mclellan, 154 Idaho 77, _ , 294 P.3d 203, 204-05 (citation
omitted).

C.

Neal Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Upholding The
Magistrate's Probable Cause Determination
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is quite limited. State v. Williams,

103 Idaho 635, 644-45, 651 P.2d 569, 578-79 (Ct. App. 1982), overruled on
other grounds State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1984). The
finding of probable cause must be based upon substantial evidence on every
material element of the offense charged, and this test may be satisfied through
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Reyes, 139 Idaho at 504, 80 P.3d at 1105; State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606,
798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 1990). The state is not required to produce all of its
evidence at a preliminary examination. Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 709, 429
P.2d 836, 839 (1967).

Rather, the state need only show that a crime was

committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it.
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57, 675 P.2d 33, 36 (1983) ("it is sufficient to
state that the evidence produced by the State at the preliminary hearing
established that a crime had been committed and a reasonable person would
believe that Gibson had probably or likely participated in the commission of the
offense charged"). Reviewing courts will not substitute their judgment for that of
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the magistrate as to the weight of the evidence and a probable cause finding will
not be disturbed if any reasonable view of the evidence, including permissible
inferences, support findings that the offense occurred and the accused
committed it. 19.:_ (citing State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 299, 912 P.2d 664,
667 (Ct. App. 1995)).
The state charged Neal with a violation of l.C. § 37-2732(c) based on the
allegation that "on or about the 4th day of April, 2011, . . . [Neal] did
constructively possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methadone, a Schedule II
controlled substance." (R., pp.5-6, 25.) The elements of this offense required
the state to prove there was probable cause to believe Neal, on or about the
date alleged, "possessed any amount of' methadone and that she knew it was
methadone or believed it was a controlled substance.

ICJI 403; see State v.

Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 151, 983 P.2d 217, 224 (Ct. App. 1999) (possession
offense requires proof of general intent

- that the defendant "knowingly

possessed a controlled substance, i.e., that the defendant had knowledge of the
presence of a drug"). Possession can be established by proving actual physical
possession or constructive possession. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521, 887
P.2d 57, 66 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). To prove constructive possession,
the state need only prove "dominion and control over the substance." Kopsa,
126 Idaho at 521, 887 P.2d at 66 (citation omitted).

"What is crucial to the

state's proof is a sufficient showing of a nexus between the accused and the
controlled substance." 19.:_ "Knowledge of the existence of controlled substances
may be inferred through circumstances." 19.:_
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In Groce, the Court identified several circumstances "which may be used
to find the requisite knowledge, other than the mere fact of possession." 133
Idaho at 152, 983 P.2d at 225. Those circumstances include:
the manner in which the drug was wrapped, stored or carried;
attempts to conceal, dispose of or destroy the contraband;
attempts to avoid detection or arrest; the presence of drug
paraphernalia; the possession of other contraband or cutting
agents; indications that the defendant was under the influence of
drugs; the presence of fresh needle marks; as well as the
proximity, accessibility and location of the contraband.
Groce, 133 Idaho at 152, 983 P.2d at 225 (citation omitted).
At the preliminary hearing, the state presented the testimony of Detective
Chris McGilvery. (P.H. Tr., pp.1-11.) Detective McGilvery testified that he was
dispatched to St. Luke's hospital on April 4, 2011, "to assist the Department of
Health and Welfare with a baby which had been born and had tested positive for
methadone."

(P.H. Tr., p.3, L.15 - p.4, L.5.)

As part of his investigation,

Detective McGilvery made contact with Neal, the baby's mother. (P.H. Tr., p.4,
Ls.6-19.)

Detective McGilvery questioned Neal about her "use of opiates or

other controlled substances." (P.H. Tr., p.6, Ls.6-9.) Because the infant tested
positive for methadone, Detective McGilvery specifically asked Neal if she "had
ever taken methadone or been prescribed methadone." (P.H. Tr., p.6, Ls.13-15.)
Neal denied ever taking methadone or having a prescription for it. (P.H. Tr., p.7,
Ls.2-3.)

Neal did, however, admit "she had been taking hydrocodone," which

had been lawfully prescribed to her.

(P.H. Tr., p.7, Ls.8-12.) The state also

submitted two exhibits - one demonstrating Neal "had a baby on 3/27/2011" and
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the other showing "the hospital's findings regarding the methadone findings in
cord tissue." 1 (P.H. Tr., p.12, Ls.12-25.)
Based on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, the court
found sufficient evidence that Neal possessed a controlled substance without a
prescription. (P.H. Tr., p.14, Ls.12-18.) The district court agreed the evidence
was sufficient for purposes of probable cause. (R., pp.64-68.)
Neal "does not contest that methadone was found in the umbilical cord
blood of her baby" and "does not dispute that she did not have a prescription for
methadone." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) "What Ms. Neal does challenge is that [sic]
the district court's conclusion that because methadone was present in the
umbilical cord blood of B.N., she 'possessed' methadone in violation of l.C. § 3727329(c)."

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

Application of the standards governing

probable cause to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing shows Neal
has failed to establish error in the denial of her motion to dismiss.
As an initial matter, Neal contends "actual possession is not an issue, as
both the Complaint and the Information charged her specifically with constructive
possession of the methadone."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10 (emphasis original).)

Although the state's charging documents allege constructive possession, Neal is
incorrect in her assertion that this foreclosed the magistrate from finding

1

The actual exhibits have not been included in the record on appeal. (See R.,
p.91 (Certificate of Exhibits).) In fact, Exhibits 1 and 2 from the preliminary
hearing were filed under seal. (R., pp.59-60.) To the extent the exhibits are
necessary to this Court's review of the probable cause determination, the
"[m]issing portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the
trial court." State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 823, 992 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct.
App. 1999).
7

sufficient evidence of the elements of the offense based on a theory of actual
possession.

The Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v. Mclellan, 154

Idaho 77, 294 P.3d 203 (Ct. App. 2013), does not compel a contrary conclusion.
In Mclellan, the state charged a specific theory of video voyeurism under
l.C. § 18-6609(2)(b) and argued that theory to the district court.

154 Idaho at

_ , 294 P.3d at 205. The district court found a lack of probable cause on the
asserted theory and dismissed the case.

kl at_,

294 P.3d at 204. The state

appealed and the Court of Appeals rejected the proposition that the magistrate
was required to decide whether probable cause existed under any theory
regardless of whether the state asserted it.

kl

at_, 294 P.3d at 205. The

Court concluded, "the magistrate is entitled to rely on the theory and argument
set forth by the state. There is no requirement that the magistrate search the
record and the law to find alternate theories of the case for the state to proceed
under."

kl

The Court did not, however, hold that a magistrate was prohibited

from doing so. To the contrary, the Court expressly stated, "We do not hold that
a magistrate may not determine that an alternative theory exists under which the
state may wish to proceed.

kl

at_ n.2, 294 P.3d at 205 n.2. Thus, nothing

precluded the magistrate in this case from finding probable cause regardless of
the allegation that the possession was constructive, not actual.

Indeed, the

nature of the possession is not even an element of the offense that requires a
finding of probable cause, Reyes, supra, which also distinguishes this case from
Mclellan. Finally, Neal has presented no scenario in which actual possession
would not also constitute constructive possession under the facts of this case.
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Because Neal contends "actual possession is not an issue," her argument
focuses on the requirements for showing constructive possession, i.e., dominion
and control over the substance. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) Neal also asserts
the state failed to prove knowledge of the substance. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1011.) More specifically, Neal argues "the mere presence of the substance in the
blood" is insufficient to establish either knowledge or dominion and control.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) Neal is incorrect.
In support of her argument, Neal cites cases from six other jurisdictions
for the proposition that the "majority rule in other jurisdictions seems to be that
the mere presence of a controlled substance in an individual's body does not
constitute possession within the meaning of criminal statutes." (Appellant's Brief,
p.15 (citations omitted).) To the extent the cases Neal cites establish a "majority
rule," that "rule" is that a positive drug result is not, alone, sufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of possessing the
drug for which she tested positive.

However, as noted in many of the cases

upon which Neal relies, a positive drug test is circumstantial evidence of
possession and, in conjunction with other evidence, may be sufficient to prove
the defendant is guilty of possession. In the Matter of R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791, 795
(Mont. 2005) (citations omitted); State v. Vorm, 570 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991) ("We find the mere presence of cocaine metabolites in a blood or
urine sample, without additional evidence, does not constitute prima facie
evidence of knowing and voluntary possession of cocaine."); State v. Lewis, 394
N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) ("We find that evidence of a controlled
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substance in a person's urine specimen does not establish possession within the
meaning of [the statute], nor is it sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove prior
possession beyond a reasonable doubt absent probative corroborating evidence
of actual physical possession."); State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208, 212 (Kan.
1983) ("Discovery of a drug in a person's blood is circumstantial evidence
tending to prove prior possession of the drug, but it is not sufficient evidence to
establish guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").

As explained by the Montana

Supreme Court:
[O]nce a substance is ingested and then assimilated into the
bloodstream, the person who ingested it does cease to exercise
dominion and control over the substance. However, like many of
those jurisdictions which have addressed this issue, we also
conclude that the presence of an illegal substance in the body
constitutes circumstantial evidence of prior possession of that
substance. The theory is that in order to have ingested the drug
the person had to have possessed it, if even for a short period of
time.
In the Matter of R.L.H., 116 P.3d 791, 795 (Mont. 2005) (citations omitted).
Although some other jurisdictions have found a positive drug test alone is
insufficient to prove possession, there are two reasons to reject that approach in
this case.

2

First, those cases involve the sufficiency of evidence to support a

conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; they do not address the sufficiency of
evidence for finding probable cause.

The district court found this distinction

2

Although not directly on point, the Idaho Court of Appeals has concluded that
"[e]vidence of the presence of methamphetamine in [a defendant's] blood, alone,
does not demonstrate his knowledge of the drug in the vehicle beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 638, 262 P.3d 278, 281
(Ct. App. 2011 ). This conclusion does not control here because, as noted,
actual possession could support the charge against Neal.
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significant, and rightly so. (R., p.67.) As noted by the district court, the "lower
standard" at a preliminary hearing "allows the

magistrate to consider

circumstantial evidence and make reasonable inferences based on the
evidence." (R., p.67.) Neal's "knowledge can be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances, namely the presence of methadone in the cord tissue coupled
with [Neal's] prior history of prescription drug use," and "the presence of
methadone, in conjunction with [Neal's] admission of not having a prescription,
could properly indicate to a reasonable finder of fact that [Neal], at least at some
point, possessed methadone without a valid prescription." (R., pp.67-68.)
Second, in Idaho, there is no distinction between circumstantial and direct
evidence. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 374-75, 247 P.3d 582, 601-02
(2010); State v. Waggoner, 124 Idaho 716, 723-24, 864 P.2d 162, 169-70 (Ct.
App. 1993) ("The court properly instructed the jury that there is no distinction
between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence as a means of proof and
that neither is entitled to any greater weight than the other."); cf. State v. Suriner,
154 Idaho 81, _ , 294 P.3d 1093, 1099-00 (2013) (abandoning the corpus
delicti rule).

Thus, the fact that a positive blood test only qualifies as

circumstantial evidence does not equate to the conclusion that the evidence is,
alone, insufficient absent corroboration.
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Even if corroboration was necessary,

such evidence existed in this case in the form of Neal's admissions regarding
prescription drug use during her pregnancy.

3

Neal also contends that, should the Court find l.C. § 37-2732(c) is
ambiguous as to the meaning of the term "possess," any ambiguity must be
construed in her favor pursuant to the rule of lenity. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-21.)
Because the statute is not ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. Barber
v. Thomas, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and citations
omitted) ("[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure,
history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the
statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature]
intended.").
Because Neal has failed to establish the evidence was insufficient for
purpose of probable cause, she has likewise failed to establish the district court
erred in denying her motion to dismiss.

3

The state sees no reason to distinguish between a positive blood test directly
from Neal and a positive drug test from the cord blood for purposes of analyzing
whether presence of a controlled substance in the blood is sufficient to establish
probable cause of possession of that substance. Accordingly, the state will not
address Neal's separate argument that there was insufficient probable cause
because the methadone was in the cord blood as opposed to "her blood."
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) The magistrate had sufficient evidence to infer that the
source of the methadone in the umbilical cord was Neal. Had Neal proceeded to
trial, she certainly could have presented evidence that the methadone in the cord
blood came from another source. As for Neal's argument that she did not
"control" the cord blood on April 4, 2011, the date alleged in the Information,
because that was after she gave birth (Appellant's Brief, p.18), this does not
provide any basis for finding a lack of probable cause because the Complaint
alleges "on or about" (R., p.6) and, even assuming the possession charge must
be predicated on the time of ingestion, Neal cannot seriously contend (nor did
she below) that there are any notice or due process concerns for purposes of the
preliminary hearing based on the specific date in the Complaint.
12

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of
conviction entered upon Neal's guilty plea to possession of methadone.
DATED this 16th day of May, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16th day of May, 2013, served a true
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